PUBLIC RELEASE

U.S. Cyber & Critical Infrastructure Threat Assessment

Daily Critical Infrastructure Operating Picture, 48-Hour Cyber Outlook & Defensive Priorities

Prepared by CarbonDex Intelligence

TLP:CLEAR

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KEY JUDGMENT

Close exposed software and verify trusted recovery access first. Further attempts against known weaknesses are the leading near-term concern. Regional energy and connectivity developments warrant dependency checks, with escalation based on verified facility and service impact.

PUBLICATION TIME	INTELLIGENCE CUTOFF
26 Oct 2026 · 09:21 ET	26 Oct 2026 · 08:59 ET

48-HOUR FORECAST WINDOW	ASSESSMENT ID
26 Oct 2026 08:59 ET to 28 Oct 2026 08:59 ET	2026-10-26-USCI-01

READING GUIDE

Executive operating picture and forecast · pages 2-4
Developments and operational implications · pages 5-11
Defensive priorities, watchboard and accountability · pages 12-14
Sources and reference notes · pages 15-17

Final editorial revision · publication time and cutoff retained.
Read page 2 for leadership decisions and page 14 for changes since the prior daily assessment.

01 EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

THE OPERATING PICTURE · LEADERSHIP DECISIONS FOR THE NEXT 48 HOURS

Operating posture: Elevated. The immediate task is to close known routes into public websites, network administration and trusted accounts while protecting the ability to restore critical services. Available reporting does not establish that overall threat pressure is easing. [S01-S09, S22]

> KEY JUDGMENT
>
> **The most likely near-term pressure remains further attempts against exposed software. The larger business consequence is an interruption that also removes the access or supplier support needed for recovery. Fund and verify both exposure closure and an independent recovery path; treat wider energy and connectivity disruption as conditional.**

PRIORITY	BUSINESS / MISSION IMPLICATION	DECISION TODAY
1 · Secure access	Public services and central administration remain the first operational concern. [S05, S07-S09]	Authorize urgent remediation; require an owner and expiry for every exception.
2 · Prove recovery	Supplier restoration plans are conditional; a service announcement is not a completed customer restore. [S22]	Require evidence that a critical workload can be recovered using trusted access.
3 · Reduce retained trust	Stolen sessions and unused automation can preserve access after the original task or login. [S11, S13]	Remove unnecessary permissions and validate account cleanup.
4 · Check dependencies	Regional physical developments could affect organizations through actual suppliers and routes. [S19-S21]	Check fuel, network and logistics dependencies; define escalation triggers.

WHAT IS NEW, AND WHAT IS NOT

CISA's 23 October additions sharpen today's remediation priorities. Weekend reporting adds storefront persistence and regional continuity concerns. Historical token-replay and mobile-spyware research informs standing defenses; it does not show those campaigns began today. [S07, S10-S12, S19-S21]

Executive checkpoint: By today's close, ask for the remaining exposed services, the next verified recovery milestone, and any dependency with no tested alternative. No evidence reviewed establishes a common actor across the separate developments.

02 24-48 HOUR CYBER FORECAST

26 OCT 2026 08:59 ET TO 28 OCT 2026 08:59 ET

These CarbonDex judgments concern the broader threat environment, not an individual organization's breach probability. Rank reflects likelihood, evidence and operational consequence. Target sets identify who should check exposure, not confirmed victims. The structured judgment method is explained on page 4.

RANK / SCENARIO	LIKELIHOOD / CONFIDENCE	MOST RELEVANT TARGET SET
1 · Further PHP2Shell attempts [S01-S06]	Very likely / High	Internet-reachable PHP services, including embedded runtimes and hosted portals.
2 · Further exploitation of affected management and collaboration services [S07-S09]	Likely / Moderate	Unpatched VeloCloud Orchestrators with reachable authenticated access; affected Nextcloud built-in CODE apps.
3 · Continuing supplier recovery constraints [S22]	Likely / Moderate	Organizations dependent on affected Cloud Backup functions and staged re-enrollment.
4 · Further identity misuse [S11-S13]	Likely / Moderate	Accounts or automation with usable stolen sessions, retained grants or excessive permissions.
5 · Further storefront persistence [S10]	Likely / Moderate	Already-compromised stores where the original access or a backdoor remains.
6 · Further coding-agent instruction abuse [S14]	Possible / Moderate	Development environments that allow unreviewed instructions to change tools, credentials or execution.
7 · Additional Gulf-linked service or supply interruption [S19-S20]	Possible / Low	Organizations with material regional fuel, communications, cloud or logistics dependencies.

> **FORECAST INTERPRETATION**
>
> **Continuation is strongest where attackers already have a usable access path. Successful compromise, physical damage and a particular customer outage are separate outcomes requiring additional evidence. Scenario 7 is a dependency contingency, not a forecast of a generalized U.S. outage.**

All seven scenarios use the same 48-hour window. "Continuing" describes status and is not a likelihood band. Rationale and revision tests follow on page 4; prior-forecast accountability appears on page 14.

02 FORECAST DRIVERS & REASSESSMENT

WHY EACH SCENARIO IS RANKED · WHAT WOULD CHANGE IT

SCENARIO	RATIONALE AND EXPECTED CONSEQUENCE	OBSERVABLE REVISION TEST
1 · PHP attempts	Attempt telemetry and later researcher reporting favor continuation; exposed services can provide wider access. [S05-S06]	Raise urgency: dated execution evidence. Weaken global outlook: sustained comparable decline in attempts. Patching lowers local exposure.
2 · Management / collaboration	Known exploitation favors continuation where product-specific prerequisites and exposure remain. [S07-S09]	Escalate on unauthorized administration or persistence. Lower local exposure with verified fixes and investigation of prior access.
3 · Recovery constraints	A staged return conditional on testing makes uneven availability likely during the window. [S22]	Lower on confirmed availability and a successful customer restore; raise after a failed milestone or restore.
4 · Identity misuse	Session theft and retained privileges support continued misuse of usable access; fresh victim counts remain unknown. [S11-S13]	Raise on unauthorized sign-ins, grants or recovery-method changes. Lower locally after revocation and validated cleanup.
5 · Storefront persistence	Repeated changes to previously infected stores favor continued activity where access survives cleanup. [S10]	Escalate on reinjection or unauthorized writes. Weaken after the entry path and persistence are removed and monitoring stays clean.
6 · Coding agents	A blocked field attempt and controlled tests establish a credible mechanism; prevalence is uncertain. [S14]	Raise on new field incidents. Lower locally with controlled workspaces, reviewed tools and enforceable permission limits.
7 · Gulf dependencies	Claims and conditional threats justify a contingency; neither timing nor local consequence is established. [S19-S20]	Raise on independently confirmed facility, route or supplier impact. Lower with reliable normal service and tested independent alternatives.

LIKELIHOOD SCALE · VERSION 1.0

Very unlikely: 0-<20%; **unlikely:** 20-<40%; **possible:** 40-<60%; **likely:** 60-<80%; **very likely:** 80-100%. Boundaries belong to the higher band. These are structured analyst judgment bands, not statistically calibrated model estimates.

How judgments are formed: We weigh current and historical exploitation evidence, opportunity for continued activity, exposure and technical prerequisites, persistence, source credibility and gaps, and operational conditions within the window. **Likelihood** estimates the defined event's chance; **confidence** reflects evidence strength, completeness and reliability. High consequence does not imply high likelihood.

03 EXPLOITATION AND EXPOSED SERVICES

PHP2SHELL · PATCH THE RUNTIME AND INVESTIGATE EARLIER ACCESS

PHP REMAINS THE LEADING IMMEDIATE CYBER PRIORITY

Observed: PHP released fixes on 21 October for CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619. Both can permit unauthenticated code execution under affected conditions. The weaknesses are in PHP itself; updating a website application alone does not verify remediation of its runtime. [S01-S03]

SUPPORTED PHP BRANCH	FIRST FIXED VERSION FOR BOTH CVEs	REQUIRED VERIFICATION
8.2	8.2.35	Verify the runtime actually serving requests.
8.3	8.3.36	Verify active workers use the updated build.
8.4	8.4.27	Check vendor-packaged and embedded copies.
8.5	8.5.12	Record completion and remaining exceptions.

For older branches, use a supported upgrade or verified vendor backport. Configuration mitigations cover particular paths, not both vulnerabilities completely. [S02-S03]

ATTEMPTS, SUCCESS AND ATTRIBUTION ARE DIFFERENT CLAIMS

Amazon observed attempts from 17 October and broader post-disclosure activity, without establishing real-system success. Hunt back before patch day. CYFIRMA's 24 October revision reports targeted scanning and a suspected North Korean nexus; this remains its attribution assessment, not a confirmed actor or shared campaign. [S05-S06]

Correction to external reporting: On 25 October, Unit 42 withdrew its 23 October association of a European government intrusion with PHP2Shell: it could not confirm that initial access used either CVE. That case is not verified PHP2Shell compromise; the separate attempt evidence remains. [S24]

SEPARATE CONFIGURATION ISSUE · CVE-2026-115560

PHP's 23 October notice describes an unusual combination: upload progress remains enabled, configuration uses php_binary or php_serialize, and application code switches to php before session_start(). It advises session.upload_progress.enabled=0 pending a regular release; applications that never change the handler at runtime are distinguished in the notice. The 21 October fixes do not close this separate issue. [S04]

> STRATEGIC JUDGMENT
>
> **Patch status and incident status are separate. Require runtime verification, review evidence of earlier intrusion, and preserve logs before remediation where feasible. A fixed system can still require cleanup if access was obtained before the update.**

03 MANAGEMENT, COLLABORATION & STOREFRONT EXPOSURE

PRODUCT-SPECIFIC ACTIONS · PATCHING DOES NOT REMOVE PERSISTENCE

CISA added both vulnerabilities below to KEV on 23 October, with a listed remediation due date of 26 October. Federal teams should check the catalog's applicable requirements; other operators should use the entries as evidence-based urgency, not assume that every Arista or Collabora product is affected. [S07]

PRODUCT / VULNERABILITY	APPLICABILITY AND ACTION
Arista VeloCloud Orchestrator CVE-2026-114625	Arista confirms active exploitation. On-premises branches: 5.2.x before 5.2.3.18; 6.1.x before 6.1.3.10; 6.4.x before 6.4.2.12. A valid portal session is required, including the lowest built-in tenant role. Hosted and Dedicated versions were already patched. [S08]
Nextcloud built-in Collabora CODE CVE-2026-110447	Affected richdocumentscode versions precede 26.4.303. The attack works while the built-in CODE server is not running. Upgrade or remove the app: disabling it is insufficient. Standalone Collabora Online is not affected. [S09]

Operational implication: A central administration compromise could change settings across dependent services. Confirm the deployment and prerequisites first, restrict unnecessary access, and preserve evidence of unexpected privilege or configuration changes.

ONLINE STORES · PERSISTENCE, NOT 953 NEW MONDAY BREACHES

Sansec's 24 October research counts 953 stores cumulatively since July 2025, mostly Magento. Its newest loader appeared on 83 stores; many were prior victims. The operator changed the loader on 23 October. Sansec had not captured the current final payload, so the reporting does not establish a uniform theft outcome for those stores. [S10]

Assessment: For affected retailers, removing a visible script without removing the underlying access can leave a route back in. Review content integrity, unauthorized accounts and persistence alongside patching. This is relevant to exposed commerce workflows; it does not establish compromise of unrelated critical-infrastructure systems.

> STRATEGIC JUDGMENT
>
> **Prioritize by actual deployment and operational reach. A vulnerable collaboration app, a network controller and a compromised storefront need different containment plans; their shared lesson is to verify both the fix and the removal of unauthorized access.**

04 IDENTITY AND ACCESS EXPOSURE

PROTECT TRUSTED ACCOUNTS, MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS AND AUTOMATION

MICROSOFT 365 · HISTORICAL CAMPAIGN, CURRENT CONTROL LESSON

Huntress's 22 October publication describes token replay from 14 July through 22 September 2026. Stolen proof of a completed login enabled account access; the source also describes attacker-added authentication methods and devices. These findings do not measure new victims on 26 October. [S11]

Required response where evidence warrants: Revoke sessions, reset credentials, and remove unauthorized authentication methods, devices and mailbox changes. A password reset alone does not demonstrate that persistence has been removed. This supports standing identity defense, not a claim that every reader is under the same campaign. [S11]

uCREATOR · MODIFIED APPS CAN EXPOSE MESSAGING ACCOUNTS

Ovi's 21 October analysis describes an Android surveillance platform using modified applications and a container to access messaging data, including Telegram and WeChat. The work establishes capabilities, not a reliable victim total or a new U.S. infrastructure campaign. The initial delivery route was not established for every victim. [S12]

Business implication: If staff rely on messaging for incident coordination or supplier approvals, device integrity becomes part of communications assurance. Use approved applications and a verified alternate contact route; investigate suspicious sessions without assuming the underlying encryption was broken.

DORMANT AI AGENTS · INACTIVITY DOES NOT REVOKE ACCESS

Arrakis reports that many agents in its customer telemetry retained credentials and connections despite long periods of inactivity. Its findings describe a sampled access-governance problem, not confirmed compromise or a prevalence estimate for all organizations. [S13]

CHECK	EVIDENCE OF COMPLETION
Named owner and purpose	Every agent with material access has an accountable owner and justified business role.
Retired or unnecessary access	Associated credentials, delegated grants and triggers are revoked or disabled and verified.
Necessary infrequent automation	An explicit exception records allowed actions, review date and monitored activity.

> STRATEGIC JUDGMENT
>
> **Treat human sessions, mobile accounts and automated identities as separate access paths with common governance needs. A shared control weakness does not demonstrate a shared attacker.**

05 AI, SOFTWARE WORKFLOWS & SERVICE RESILIENCE

SEPARATE FIELD OBSERVATIONS, CONTROLLED TESTS AND POLICY ANNOUNCEMENTS

CODING-AGENT INSTRUCTIONS · A BLOCKED ATTEMPT AND LAB REPRODUCTIONS

Forever Security reported blocking a coding agent from installing the malicious npm package function-color after it read an AGENTS.md file in Downloads. It separately reproduced instruction-file abuse in controlled tests involving Codex and Claude Code. The observed customer attempt was blocked; laboratory success does not establish widespread downstream compromise. [S14]

Assessment: Unreviewed workspace instructions can become a path from external content to privileged actions. Keep downloaded material separate from trusted workspaces, review tool and dependency changes, and enforce permission limits that an agent cannot casually override. Investigate changed configurations or exposed secrets where there is evidence of execution.

INDUSTRIAL AI RESEARCH · CAPABILITY IS NOT AN INCIDENT

Frenos tested attack planning and safe simulations using supplied context. The study found material variation and repeatability limits; it did not demonstrate an autonomous model independently finding and attacking an industrial system. Its longer-term capability estimate is a researcher forecast, not this report's 48-hour warning. [S15]

Operational implication: Industrial teams should constrain remote administration, preserve engineering-system visibility and rehearse safe response with operators. Research results do not justify disruptive changes to production controls without validation.

UK INVESTMENT · ANNOUNCED DEFENSES, NOT IMMEDIATE PROTECTION

The UK Government's 24 October package includes a £60 million National Cyber Shield and a £70 million vulnerability centre. These are announced investments; the release does not establish deployed coverage or measured reductions in current attacks. [S16]

AUSTRALIAN GUIDANCE · THE SPECIFIC CONTEXT IS PHP

ASD's ACSC guidance reviewed on 22 October calls for identifying PHP, applying updates and monitoring related systems. This guidance addresses PHP exposure; it does not itself establish a separate, ongoing outage. [S17]

> **STRATEGIC JUDGMENT**
>
> **Invest in enforceable access boundaries and resilient operations. Neither the presence of AI in a story nor an announced defensive program establishes a new coordinated attack, imminent industrial failure or a completed safeguard.**

06 PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE & CONTINUITY RISKS

REGIONAL EVENTS MATTER THROUGH REAL DEPENDENCIES

DEVELOPMENT	EVIDENCE STATUS	OPERATIONAL RELEVANCE
Saudi infrastructure claims	Reuters' early 26 October dispatch reported Houthi claims involving East-West pumping stations and Riyadh airport, without immediate Saudi confirmation. [S19]	Do not infer damage, lost throughput or customer impact from the claim alone.
Gulf cable threats	Reuters attributed conditional cable-attack plans to Iranian officials on 23 October. This is a threat statement, not an observed cable cut. [S20]	Review route diversity and supplier escalation paths where regional connectivity matters.
UK storm recovery	Sky News, citing the Energy Networks Association, reported about 90,000 customers without power at 19:00 UK time on 25 October after Storm Boelo. This is a historical snapshot, not the 08:59 ET cutoff total. [S21]	Check affected sites and suppliers directly; do not infer a nationwide communications or data-center failure.

WHAT A U.S. OPERATOR SHOULD ESTABLISH

First, identify a material dependency: a fuel supplier, transit route, overseas support team, network carrier or hosted service. Second, ask for measured service status and available alternatives. Third, tie escalation to business tolerance rather than the prominence of a headline.

For data centers and infrastructure operators, useful evidence includes available fuel under actual delivery constraints, usable network diversity, staffing access and the ability to operate during an external-service interruption. These are recommended checks; the report has not measured any reader's environment.

DECISION THRESHOLD

Escalate when a supplier reports a relevant loss of capacity, an operator confirms facility damage, or observed service degradation exceeds an agreed tolerance. Keep preparedness proportionate while facts remain incomplete. An attacker statement and a weather-related outage are separate reporting streams.

> STRATEGIC JUDGMENT
>
> **The practical risk is dependency concentration: an alternate service may rely on the same route, supplier or access mechanism. Test independence before treating a backup option as a reliable continuity measure.**

07 CROSS-THREAT CORRELATION

SHARED EXPOSURES AND CONSEQUENCES · NO COMMON ACTOR INFERRED

The priority judgments below concern classes of organizations and systems. They are not quantified sector-wide risk scores. Relevance depends on actual deployments, permissions and supply relationships.

SECTOR / FUNCTION	PRIORITY AND EVIDENCE	CONSEQUENCE TO TEST
IT, cloud and data-center operations	Immediate where public services or central management match the affected products. [S01-S09]	Could containment remove administration, visibility or restoration access at the same time?
Federal and public services	Immediate applicability review for listed KEV products; preserve continuity of essential public workflows. [S07-S09]	Are remaining exceptions owned, time-limited and supported by compensating measures?
Energy and communications	Exposure-based cyber action; conditional regional continuity review. [S19-S21]	Would fuel, carrier, route or overseas supplier loss exceed the operating tolerance?
Healthcare	Supplier and sensitive-data assurance; the Quest disclosure is a specific incident. [S18]	Can workflows continue through approved alternatives without inferring a broader clinical outage?
Retail / commercial facilities	Immediate integrity review for affected storefronts. [S10]	Could persistent access survive cleanup and affect customers or transaction confidence?
Software development / AI workflows	Near-term review of instruction trust and retained automated access. [S13-S15]	Can external content trigger unauthorized tools, credentials or deployment changes?

HEALTHCARE CASE · KEEP THE DISCLOSURE BOUNDED

Quest Diagnostics' 22 October filing says it discovered unauthorized Quanum LSM access on 21 October and believes certain patient records were accessed. Scope remained under investigation; the company reported no material disruption to operations or patient service at filing. This does not establish a continuing Monday outage or a connection to PHP2Shell. [S18]

> CORRELATION JUDGMENT
>
> **The common operational question is whether trusted access and fallback arrangements still work under stress. Similar consequences across incidents do not establish shared infrastructure, coordination or attribution.**

08 GEOPOLITICAL RISKS TO U.S. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

48-HOUR DEPENDENCY OUTLOOK · CONDITIONAL ESCALATION

Assessment: Gulf-related developments warrant focused continuity planning. The evidence supports attention to material regional dependencies, but does not justify a general forecast of U.S. infrastructure failure or a confident direction-of-travel label for every sector. [S19-S20]

PATHWAY	CONDITIONAL OPERATIONAL EFFECT	TRIGGER FOR LEADERSHIP ACTION
Energy supply and transport	Confirmed damage or restricted transit could affect delivery schedules and supplier resilience. Price movements alone would not prove an interruption to a particular operator.	Supplier allocation notice, confirmed route restriction, or a verified reduction in available supply.
International connectivity	A relevant network incident could reduce usable capacity or increase latency; actual consequence depends on route diversity and spare capacity.	Carrier incident notice, sustained degradation or evidence that alternate routes share the same failure point.
Cloud and regional support	Regional disruption could affect a site or the external support needed to operate it. No reader-specific impact is established.	Provider status change, failed recovery test or loss of a critical support function.
Escalation or stabilization	New confirmed attacks would strengthen the downside case. Reliable normal service and functioning alternatives would reduce local concern.	Corroborated operational evidence, not a threat statement or diplomatic headline alone.

WHAT THIS ASSESSMENT DOES NOT INFER

It does not infer that alleged attacks caused verified physical damage; that a cable threat has become a cable outage; or that separate cyber incidents are components of a coordinated geopolitical campaign. Attribution, event occurrence and operational impact each require their own evidence.

The useful executive question is whether an actual dependency has changed enough to require a decision. Procurement, network operations and continuity teams should provide that assessment together, with the source and time of their latest verification.

> STRATEGIC JUDGMENT
>
> **Maintain a prepared response to regional disruption while preserving capacity for the more immediate software and identity priorities. Reallocate resources when observable dependency impact crosses an agreed threshold.**

09 DEFENSIVE PRIORITIES FOR TODAY

ACCOUNTABLE ACTION · EVIDENCE OF COMPLETION · RESIDUAL RISK

WHEN / OWNER	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION EVIDENCE / REMAINING RISK
Today · Platform and security leads	Identify affected PHP, VeloCloud and built-in CODE deployments; patch, remove or approve a time-limited containment exception. [S01-S09]	Verified running version or vendor attestation, exposure review and preserved logs. Patching does not rule out earlier access.
Today · Identity / response leads	Investigate suspicious sessions and persistence; revoke relevant access and validate cleanup. [S11-S13]	Relevant sessions revoked; unauthorized grants, methods and devices removed; logs reviewed. Missing telemetry remains a gap.
Today · Service / continuity owners	Confirm which backup functions are available; verify a restore and an independent administrative path. [S22]	Successful test with recovery time and data recency recorded. A supplier target date is not completion.
Within 24 hours · Engineering leads	Review agent workspace trust, tool registration, dependency changes and unused automated access. [S13-S15]	Named owners, revoked unnecessary permissions and enforced execution limits. Review exposed secrets if misuse is found.
Within 24 hours · Commerce owners	For affected stores, remove persistence and its entry path alongside content cleanup. [S10]	Known-good content, reviewed accounts and monitored writes. Script removal alone is insufficient.
Within 24-48 hours · Operations / procurement	Check material fuel, power, communications and supplier dependencies; validate alternatives. [S19-S21]	Current supplier status, tested alternatives and a defined escalation threshold. Headlines are not local exposure evidence.

LEADERSHIP CLOSEOUT

Require a short exception list: the affected service, business consequence, accountable owner, temporary control and next decision time. Confirm who can authorize isolation, rerouting or service restoration. Avoid treating an unverified vendor statement or a completed change ticket as proof that the service is secure and recoverable.

> **PRIORITY**
>
> **Close the most consequential exposed access first. Preserve the access, evidence and operational options needed to recover safely. Escalate unresolved exceptions before they become silent assumptions in continuity plans.**

10 WATCHBOARD & METHODOLOGY

OBSERVABLE CONDITIONS · OWNER-RELEVANT REASSESSMENT

WATCH CONDITION	WHAT WOULD CHANGE THE ASSESSMENT	DECISION RESPONSE
Public-service exploitation	New dated attempts, successful execution, web shells or unauthorized writes in relevant systems. [S05-S09]	Re-rank exposed services and widen investigation where evidence supports it.
Identity / automated access	Unauthorized sessions, grants, authentication changes or agent-trigger activity. [S11-S14]	Contain the affected identity and validate removal of persistence.
Supplier recovery	Confirmed restoration, a missed milestone, or a failed customer restore. [S22]	Adjust the recovery plan; keep service-specific restrictions until cleared.
Storefront integrity	Fresh reinjection, changed content or retained administrator access. [S10]	Investigate the underlying access, not just the visible script.
Regional continuity	Independent facility confirmation, carrier or supplier notices, or measured degradation. [S19-S21]	Activate the relevant continuity plan when business tolerance is crossed.

METHOD AND LIMITATIONS

Observed: directly supported by the cited source. **Assessed:** CarbonDex inference about relevance or a future scenario. **Watch condition:** evidence that would change a judgment. **Standing risk:** useful context without a verified new development. Vendor and researcher claims remain attributed when independent corroboration is unavailable.

This public assessment uses open sources and does not include customer telemetry or validate a particular organization’s exposure. Publication dates, event dates and update times are distinguished. Current research can describe older activity; a retained advisory is not proof of a new incident.

The cutoff is **26 October 2026 at 08:59 ET (12:59 UTC)**. The forecast ends **28 October at 08:59 ET**. Later source updates are outside the assessment. Where only a date is available, precise intraday ordering is not claimed.

> READING THE FORECAST
>
> **Likelihood estimates whether the defined scenario occurs within the forecast window. Confidence reflects evidence strength, completeness and reliability: high = strong direct support; moderate = credible support with material gaps; low = sparse or contingent support. No calibrated statistical model or forecast-accuracy rate is claimed.**

10 CHANGE TRACKING & PRIOR-FORECAST REVIEW

BASELINE: 23 OCTOBER DAILY EDITION · CLOSED WINDOW ENDED 25 OCTOBER 12:14 ET

STATUS	CHANGE SINCE THE PRIOR EDITION	IMPLICATION
NEW / added coverage	KEV entries, storefront-persistence research and regional reporting added. [S07, S10, S19-S21]	New evidence or coverage; not necessarily newly begun activity.
UNCHANGED	Software and trusted access remain priorities; identity research is historical context. [S05, S08, S11]	No comparable telemetry establishes a broad easing of activity.
DECREASED	No verified closure of prior ranked risks established.	Omission or fewer headlines does not mean resolution.
EXPIRED	The prior 48-hour forecast window closed. [S23]	Score within that window; unresolved risk may continue.

PRIOR OUTCOMES · EVIDENCE-BOUNDED CLASSIFICATION

PRIOR FORECAST / ORIGINAL RATING	OUTCOME	TIME-MATCHED EVIDENCE AND LIMITATION
PHP attempts Very likely / High	Partially supported	CYFIRMA reports 24 Oct scanning and attempts; independent corroboration remains limited. Unit 42 withdrew its separate intrusion association. [S06, S23-S24]
VeloCloud Likely / Moderate	Not assessable	KEV inclusion supplies no new incident time. Further exploitation within the window cannot be established. [S07-S08, S23]
Identity abuse Likely / Moderate	Not assessable	Historical token replay predates the window; no adequate new, dated outcome was verified. [S11, S23]
Recovery constraints Likely / Moderate	Supported	25 Oct, 14:00 UTC: supplier restrictions and staged restoration persisted, before the 16:14 UTC window close. [S22-S23]
LiteLLM secrets Likely / Moderate, conditional	Not assessable	No verified downstream reuse in the window. Conditional risk is not a confirmed outcome. [S23]
Refrigeration Possible / Moderate	Not assessable	No newly dated misuse verified within the original window. [S23]
Regional dependencies Possible / Low	Not assessable	Threat statements are not realized disruption; Monday claims are outside the window. [S20, S23]

Supported: dated evidence supports the event. **Partially supported:** some activity is supported, with material gaps. **Not assessable:** reliable, time-matched evidence is insufficient. Reporting date is not event date. Missing reporting is not failure; incomplete observations cannot support an accuracy rate.

11 SOURCES AND REFERENCE NOTES

PRIMARY TECHNICAL EVIDENCE · SOURCE IDS LINK BACK FROM BODY PASSAGES

Entries identify the dated evidence used in this assessment. Linked titles open the source; body references navigate to these notes. Related IDs are grouped where a passage combines release details, observed activity and analytic interpretation.

S01 · PHP Foundation · 21 Oct 2026

Critical PHP security release — Release context, demonstrated exploitability and supported-branch fixes for PHP2Shell.

S02 · PHP security team · 21 Oct 2026

GHSA-w8hw-w9fx-j79w — CVE-2026-109618: out-of-memory corruption, affected branches and fixed versions.

S03 · PHP security team · 21 Oct 2026

GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp — CVE-2026-109619: stale global state; configuration mitigations have limited coverage.

S04 · PHP project · 23 Oct 2026

Session upload progress advisory — CVE-2026-115560 configuration prerequisites and interim guidance pending a regular release.

S05 · Amazon Threat Intelligence · 21 Oct 2026

PHP2Shell attempts in MadPot — Sensor-observed attempts from 17 Oct, additional attempts on 21 Oct and limits on inferring real-world success.

S06 · CYFIRMA · 23 Oct; v3 dated 24 Oct 2026

Suspected DPRK PHP2Shell campaign — Attributed scanning and suspected North Korean nexus. Researcher assessment, not independently established attribution; v3 only.

S07 · CISA · 23 Oct 2026 · 19:30 UTC release

Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog — Collabora CVE-2026-110447 and Arista CVE-2026-114625 added 23 Oct; listed due date 26 Oct. Reviewed catalog 2026.10.23.

S08 · Arista · 22 Oct 2026

Security Advisory 0199 — CVE-2026-114625 confirmed exploitation, authenticated access requirement, affected on-premises branches and hosted-service patch status.

Technical distinction: A vendor’s confirmed exploitation statement, sensor-observed attempts and researcher attribution are not interchangeable. The body retains those distinctions even when the same vulnerability appears in several sources.

11 SOURCES AND REFERENCE NOTES

APPLICATIONS, IDENTITY, AI AND RESILIENCE · CONTINUED

S09 · Collabora Online · 14 Oct 2026

GHSA-g3vx-3m76-fghh — CVE-2026-110447 affects built-in CODE app before 26.4.303; upgrade or remove, not simply disable. Standalone servers excluded.

S10 · Sansec · 24 Oct 2026

Magento CMS-block loader campaign — 953 stores cumulatively since July 2025; October loader changes and persistent access. Current final payload not captured.

S11 · Huntress · 22 Oct 2026

M365 token spray and replay campaign — Historical activity from 14 July to 22 September 2026; stolen sessions, persistence and containment guidance.

S12 · Ovi / 0x0v1 · 21 Oct 2026

uCreator Android surveillance research — Messaging-account interception capabilities in modified apps; victim volume and individual operation attribution remain unresolved.

S13 · Arrakis Security / GlobeNewswire · 22 Oct 2026 · 02:34 ET

Autonomous agents threat report announcement — Vendor-reported customer telemetry on dormant agents retaining permissions; sample-specific exposure, not an incident count.

S14 · Forever Security · 22 Oct 2026

Malicious instructions in Downloads — Blocked real-world package-install attempt and separate controlled reproductions involving coding-agent instruction files.

S15 · Frenos / Business Wire · 21 Oct 2026

State of AI in OT Security research — Simulated attack-planning capabilities and limitations; no autonomous industrial attack demonstrated.

S16 · HM Treasury / UK Government · 24 Oct 2026

AI security investment announcement — Announced National Cyber Shield and vulnerability-centre funding; policy intent rather than deployed protection.

S17 · ASD's ACSC · 21 Oct; reviewed 22 Oct 2026

Critical vulnerabilities in PHP — Australian agency guidance to identify, update and monitor PHP; not evidence of a separate ongoing outage.

Research interpretation: Sample-specific counts and laboratory results are not population-wide incidence rates. Historical campaigns and standing control lessons are labeled accordingly.

11 SOURCES AND REFERENCE NOTES

INCIDENT DISCLOSURES, REGIONAL REPORTING AND ANALYTIC CONTINUITY

S18 · Quest Diagnostics / SEC · 22 Oct 2026 · 06:53 ET filing

Form 8-K, Item 8.01 — 21 Oct discovery of unauthorized Quanum LSM access; possible patient-record access and no material operating disruption reported at filing.

S19 · Reuters · 26 Oct 2026; wire copy updated 06:29 ET

Houthi claims concerning Saudi infrastructure — Attributed Saudi infrastructure claims and lack of immediate confirmation; syndicated Reuters version predates the cutoff.

S20 · Reuters · 23 Oct 2026 · 16:54 UTC

Conditional Gulf undersea-cable threats — Claims attributed to Iranian officials, conditional on renewed attacks. Does not establish an actual cable outage.

S21 · Sky News / Energy Networks Association · 26 Oct 2026; event 25 Oct evening

Storm Boelo recovery reporting — About 90,000 customers still without power at 19:00 UK time on 25 Oct, attributed to the network association; historical snapshot, not a cutoff total.

S22 · ConnectWise · 25 Oct 2026 · 14:00 UTC update

Cloud Backup restoration update — Conditional 26 Oct restoration/onboarding targets; retain affected-connection restrictions until service-specific instructions. Distinct from Axcient portal restoration.

S23 · CarbonDex Intelligence · 23 Oct 2026 · cutoff 12:14 ET

Prior daily assessment: 2026-10-23-USCI-01 — Baseline for change tracking and review of the forecast ending 25 Oct at 12:14 ET. Not independent confirmation of external claims.

S24 · Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 · 25 Oct 2026 correction

PHP2Shell threat brief: retracted intrusion association — Withdraws the 23 Oct link between a government intrusion and the specific PHP2Shell CVEs; initial access was not confirmed.

REPORTING-WINDOW AND VERIFICATION NOTE

Publication time remains 26 October 2026 at 09:21 ET; the original 08:59 ET cutoff and assessment ID are unchanged. Later updates are excluded. Attributed allegations are not independent confirmation; the UK outage count is a dated snapshot. ConnectWise's 25 October update is the last version used.

Sources may change after publication. Check current vendor and operator guidance separately from this timestamped assessment. No customer-specific exposure is asserted.

TAILORED INTELLIGENCE REPORTING

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